This paper seeks to quantify the contribution of agglomeration economies to the spatial concentration of U.S. employment. A spatial macroeconomic model with heterogeneous localities and agglomeration economies is developed and calibrated to U.S. data on the spatial distribution of employment. The model is used to answer the question: By how much would the spatial concentration of employment decline if agglomeration economies were counterfactually suppressed? For the most plausible calibration, the answer is about 48 percent. More generally, the general equilibrium contribution of agglomeration economies appears to be substantial, with empirically defensible calibrations yielding estimates between 40 and 60 percent.
Introduction
The bulk of the economic activity of an industrially developed country takes place in densely settled areas that make up a small portion of a country's overall territory. This striking spatial concentration is thought to result from two distinct sources. The first source is locational fundamentals -i.e., the need to extract and/or use a natural resource. The second source are agglomeration economies -i.e., the cost advantages conferred by spatial concentration itself.
The goal of this paper is to quantify the relative importance of these two sources for the spa- Agglomeration economies are a venerable topic in industrial organization -going back at least to Alfred Marshall's celebrated discussion of industry-level increasing returns. However, empirical studies that seek to confirm the perceived importance of agglomeration economies are of relatively recent vintage and are not very supportive of the importance of increasing returns. Kim (1999) used the predictions of the standard H-O-V trade model to argue that a small number of factorendowment variables can account for a significant fraction of the variation in U.S. State manufacturing production in the late nineteenth and mid twentieth centuries. Ellison and Glaeser (1999) examined how measures of industry concentration decline when account is taken of the availability of a limited set of natural resources. Like Kim, they too conclude that natural advantages may well account for the bulk of the industrial concentration observed in the U.S. Rappaport and Sachs (2002) sought to give prominence to the contribution of access to water (to a coast, navigable river or lake) for the spatial variation in employment. More recently, Rappaport (2006) has argued that differences in fundamentals seem necessary to account for the large spatial variation in population density in the U.S.
Excepting Rappaport (2006) , a common feature of these studies is that each attempts to determine the relative importance of natural advantages by projecting spatial variation in the variable of interest (economic activity, employment, or measures of concentration) on proxies for specific natural resources. At least in the Kim and Ellison and Glaeser papers, the residual variation is viewed as an upper bound estimate of the impact of increasing returns. In contrast, the approach in this paper is to begin with estimates of agglomeration economies (surveyed in Moomaw (1981) and more recently in Rosenthal and Strange (2003) ) and determine, with the aid of a general equilibrium model, the quantitative importance of these estimates for the spatial concentration of U.S.
employment. To the extent that it is easier to establish a plausible range of variation of estimates of agglomeration economies than it is to measure the variation in natural resources, the approach developed in this paper is attractive.
The investigation is disciplined by requiring that the model on which the counterfactual is performed account for the actual spatial distribution of employment. In the model, both agglomeration economies and good location-specific fundamentals are centripetal forces (to use terms popularized by Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) ) that work to concentrate economic activity into a relatively small number of locations. These centripetal forces are opposed by a set of centrifugal forces that work to disperse employment, the most important of which is the cost imposed by congestion.
For given magnitudes of agglomeration economies and congestion cost parameters, the requirement that the model account for the actual spatial distribution of employment results in an imputation for the value of each locality's location-specific fundamentals. Thus, the empirical strategy treats locational fundamentals as a residual. When agglomeration economies are suppressed, the imputed spatial pattern of locational fundamentals becomes the only counterweight to the centrifugal force of congestion costs. A comparison of the actual and counterfactual distributions reveals the general equilibrium effect of agglomeration economies.
The comparison suggests that agglomeration economies are an important determinant of spatial concentration. Measured by the Gini concentration index, the current spatial concentration of U.S. employment is 0.78 -a very high degree of concentration. In the baseline counterfactual, the Gini concentration index turns out to be only 0.38 -a decline of about 48.5 percent. For plausible variations in the magnitude of net agglomeration benefits around the baseline value, the implied decline in the Gini concentration index varies between 40 and 60 percent. Remarkably, these large effects result from modest values of agglomeration economies. In the baseline model the magnitude of agglomeration economies is such that a doubling of the local labor force raises firm-level productivity by a little over 2 percent.
The approach followed in this paper borrows from the growth and business-cycle accounting literatures. In analogy with growth accounting, the distribution of a primary factor -in this case labor -over space (as opposed to over time) is used to back out a location-specific "TFP" residual. However, unlike the Solow residual these location-specific "TFP" terms are a composite of both production function and utility function shifters. And in analogy with (real) businesscycle accounting, the counterfactual performed in this paper provides an estimate of the spatial fluctuation in economic activity that would result solely from spatial fluctuations in location-specific "TFP" terms.
An accounting exercise is most informative if it is done using a generally accepted model.
Unlike the growth and business-cycle accounting literatures -where the neoclassical growth model is a widely accepted benchmark -there is no generally accepted benchmark model of economic geography. However, in a recent paper, Davis and Weinstein (2002) examined historical data with a view to discriminate between three competing models of economic geography. The models were (i) random growth model of city size, (ii) the market potential (costly transportation plus increasing returns) model of economic geography and (iii) a pure locational fundamentals model. In their view the evidence suggests that "the most promising direction for research is to consider a hybrid theory in which locational fundamentals play a key role in establishing the basic pattern of relative regional densities and in which increasing returns play a strong role in determining the degree of concentration."
The model used in this paper is of this hybrid type. Both locational fundamentals and increasing returns play important roles. Furthermore, the results of the counterfactual line up closely with roles of locational fundamentals and increasing returns expressed in the above quote. The imputed spatial pattern of locational fundamentals implies a much lower degree of spatial concentration but does not imply a ranking of relative densities that is very different from the one we see currently.
Specifically, while the concentration index in the counterfactual is 48.5 percent smaller than the actual concentration, the rank correlation of actual employment density and counterfactual employment density is 0.85. Thus agglomeration economies seem to account for a large portion of spatial concentration, but locational fundamentals seem largely to determine the geographic pattern of economic activity.
The specific hybrid model used in this paper is consistent with the historical trend in em- The key challenge in doing the spatial accounting comes from the fact that when congestion is the only centrifugal force -which is the simplest case to analyze -low-density localities are predicted to be in an unstable equilibrium. This happens because at low levels of employment density, congestion costs are low and the net marginal benefit from agglomeration is positive.
Consequently, theory predicts that low-density localities should either agglomerate up and become more dense or lose employment and vanish. Thus the simplest version of the model fails to account for the large numbers of low-density localities observed in reality. 2 To deal with this difficulty, two features are introduced into the model. The first feature is the presence of immobile individuals in some localities who do not make a location decision. 3 The second feature is a weakening of the scope of increasing returns -specifically, local employment is required to attain a minimum level for agglomeration economies to manifest themselves. Roughly speaking, first feature helps to restore the stability of low-density metro areas and second feature helps to restore the stability of very low-density rural areas.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 has a detailed discussion of how immobility and the agglomeration threshold restore the stability of spatial equilibrium. Section 4 describes how the model is mapped to U.S. data. Section 5 presents the results of the baseline counterfactual and provides a sensitivity analysis of the results. 4 Section 6 concludes.
The Model Economy
The model is adapted from Chatterjee and Carlino (2001) . There are M distinct geographical areas indexed by i = 1, 2, 3, ..., M . These areas will be referred to as localities. The collection of localities is assumed to exhaust the physical space available for economic activity in the economy.
Localities can differ with respect to area, with respect to the availability of natural resources, and with respect to laws and regulations that affect production and consumption possibilities. There are a large number of individuals, N > 1, who live and work in these localities.
Firms
There is one costlessly transportable composite good. The plant-level production function for producing the transportable good in locality i is
where k and l are the capital and labor used by a plant, λ is an economy-wide technology index, and φ i is an index that captures the combined impact of locality-specific factors on production capabilities. For instance, the production advantages conferred by being on the coast or on a navigable river and the impact of local labor and environmental regulations will all be captured in
is a function of total employment in locality i, denoted N i , that takes into account the external economies in production resulting from the scale of the locality's labor pool. This is one way in which agglomeration economies enter the model. The function is taken to be
The specification assumes that there is a threshold level N , potentially 1, above which agglomeration economies operate. In the range where agglomeration economies do operate the elasticity of agglomeration benefits with respect to change in local employment is a positive constant ν. 5 Each locality can also produce a good that cannot be shipped to a different locality. The plant-level production function for the non-transportable good produced in locality i is
where y is the transportable good used as input by the plant, ξ i is an index that captures the combined impact of locality-specific factors on production of the non-transportable good (analogous to φ i ), and Γ(N i , A i ) is a function that takes into account the diseconomies imposed by local congestion on the production of the non-transportable good. This function is taken to be
where A i is land area of locality i. Thus, according to (3) and (4), higher employment density in a given locality makes the production of the non-transportable good less efficient. An important property of Γ is that the absolute value of its elasticity with respect to employment density is increasing in employment density:
All plants behave competitively. Producers of locality i's non-transportable good take the
In this case, the elasticity of agglomeration benefit with respect to local employment, for
Since estimates of ν do not take the possibility of a threshold effect into account, the specification in the text was chosen over this one.
price of the transportable good and employment density in locality i as given. With the price of the transportable good as a numeraire, competitive production implies that price of the nontransportable good in location i, denoted p i , cannot exceed its marginal cost:
Producers of the transportable good in locality i take the level of local employment and the product wage in that locality, w i , as given. They also takes r as given. Again, competitive production implies that the price of the transportable good cannot exceed its marginal cost of production in locality i:
People
There are two types of individuals: mobile individuals who can move between localities and immobile individuals who cannot. I assume that there is at least 1 immobile individual in each locality,
i.e., N i ≥ 1. Both types have one unit of labor which they supply inelastically to firms producing the transportable good in their locality.
The utility of an individual living and working in locality i is given by:
where c and g are the individual's consumption of the transportable good and non-transportable good, respectively, ψ i is an index that captures the combined impact of locality-specific amenity factors (such as climate) and laws and regulations on utility.
For tractability, I assume that mobile individuals do not have any capital income. Conditional on the choice of locality, utility maximization implies that a mobile individual in locality i chooses
Thus, the indirect utility of a mobile individual residing in locality i is
Given costless mobility, a mobile individual will choose to live and work in location i only if
The demand functions of immobile individuals who reside in locality i is similar to that of mobile individuals except that they derive income from capital as well. That is, an immobile individual with asset level x who resides in locality i will choose g = θ(
For such an individual the indirect utility is
Since they are immobile, their indirect utility is not required to satisfy a condition like (10).
Equilibrium
Since there are a large number of immobile individuals in every locality, there are individuals supplying labor inelastically to firms producing the transportable good in every locality. Therefore, in any equilibrium, there must be positive production of the transportable good in every locality.
Then, it follows from (7) that
Additionally, since every locality has a large number of immobile individuals with strictly positive income (note that w i > 0), it follows that there will be a positive demand for the non-transportable good in every locality for any p i ∈ [0, ∞). Therefore, in any equilibrium, there will be positive production of the non-transportable good in every locality. Then, it follows from (6) that
Denote
by H(α, θ, λ, r), the product of locality-specific
by S i , the agglomeration economies term ν/α by µ, and the congestion externality term θγ by δ. Then, substituting (11) and (12) into (9) and using (2), yields:
The r.h.s of equation (13) incorporates the negative effect of congestion. As a locality gets more dense, the price of the locally produced non-transportable good rises. For a given rise in density, the reduction in utility is greater if the share of non-transportable good in the worker's budget, θ, is higher, if the adverse effect on the production of the non-transportable good, δ, is higher, and if initial density, N i /A i , is higher.
An equilibrium for this economy is a number V * and a vector (N * i ) M i=1 that satisfy the following conditions:
if
To see this, suppose that we have V * and (
. At these wages, production of the transportable good yields zero profits in every locality. So, production of the transportable good in any locality i can expand to the point where all N * i people are employed, i.e., at these wages the labor market in each locality can clear. Similarly, at the prices p * i the production of the non-transportable good yields zero profits in every locality. So, production of the non-transportable good in any locality i can expand to the point where total demand for the non-transportable good from mobile and immobile individuals is met, i.e., at these prices the non-transportable goods market in each locality can clear as well. 7 The only other markets in this model are those for the transportable good and capital and by assumption both are international markets with given prices. Finally, it is obvious that substituting w * i and p * i into (9) will yield V i = V * for any i with N * i > N i and V i ≤ V * for all other i. Therefore, mobile individuals do not have an incentive to move to a different location from their current one.
Agglomeration Economies and Instability of Low-Density Localities
While conditions (14) - (17) completely characterize an equilibrium, not all pairs V * , (N * i ) M i=1 that satisfy these conditions are economically meaningful. Because of increasing returns, an equilibrium may be unstable with respect to small perturbations. The aim of this section is to (i) explain why a model with congestion costs as the only centrifugal force predicts that low-density localities must be in an unstable equilibrium, (ii) explain how the assumptions of immobility and agglomeration threshold can restore the stability of low-density localities, and (iii) refine the definition of an equilibrium to exclude unstable equilibria.
It is convenient to work with logarithmic transforms. Let ln(N
by s i , and ln(N ) by n. Then, equation (13) can be written as 7 The total demand for the non-traded good in location i is θ(w *
, where x i is the average asset holdings of immobile individuals residing in locality i.
Defining ln(V i ) − µn as v i , this becomes
In what follows, I will treat N i as a continuous variable. Then, the r.h.s. of the above equation
smallest employment density possible in locality i and
First consider the case where
over its entire domain and differentiable everywhere in its interior. The first two derivatives with respect to d are Since the elasticity of congestion cost is proportional to density while that of agglomeration benefits is a constant, congestion costs rise more slowly than agglomeration benefits for low levels of density. proportionately faster than agglomeration benefits and the function declines with increasing density.
Since this inverted-U shape has important implications for the model's ability to account for lowdensity localities, it's worth noting that models of urban areas often imply that the utility available to individuals is an inverted-U function of city size -see, for instance, Fujita (Ch. 8, 1989 ). This feature of the model is therefore not unusual.
Let v * be the equilibrium utility available to mobile individuals. Then, Figure 1 The important difference between these two modifications is that in the first one stability is assured by making every resident of locality i immobile, whereas in the second modification (almost) every resident can be mobile. Thus, in the quest for stability of low-density localities an agglomeration threshold can substitute for mobility restrictions. However, for a given N (the agglomeration threshold), the substitution may not work for every locality. Because localities differ in terms of land area, their d i differs. Therefore, for some localities their actual density might fall
As shown in Figure 2 , the v i (d) function is upward sloping in this range. In such cases, one would have to resort to mobility restrictions (as in Figure 1 ) to assure stability.
In the rest of this paper, I will focus only on stable equilibria. To be clear, a stable equilibria is defined as follows.
Definition : The collection {d
} is a stable equilibrium if it satisfies the follow-ing conditions:
Conditions (21)- (24) 
Mapping the Model Economy to U.S. Data
The goal of this section is to restrict the parameters of the model so that the behavior of the model economy matches the behavior of the U.S. economy in as many dimensions as there are parameters. An important preliminary step in doing so is to decide what geographical areas in the U.S. correspond to localities in the model economy. There are two key assumptions about localities made in the model. First, the set of locations exhausts the physical space available for economic activity and, second, people live and work in the same locality. The second assumption suggests choosing the geographical areas so that there is little, or no, inter-area commuting. The first assumption suggests choosing a collection that is comprehensive enough to include most of U.S. territory. With these requirements in mind, the geographic areas were chosen to be the 17 consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs), 258 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and 2248 rural counties. Together, this gives a total of 2523 approximately self-contained labor market areas, covering all of the 48 contiguous states. 11 The numerical specification of the model described by (21) - (25) involves setting values for the (i) five economy-wide parameters, namely, the technology parameter α, the preference parameter θ, the agglomeration parameters N and ν, and the congestion parameter γ, and (ii) the 3×2523 locality-specific parameters, namely, locality areas a i , locality-specific factors s i and locality-specific density of immobile individuals d i . The calibration of these parameters is discussed below.
The technology parameter α is the exponent to labor input in the production function for the traded good. Under perfect competition, the equality of wages and marginal product of labor implies that the share of value-added absorbed by compensation to workers is α. Average α, as measured by labor's share in U.S. GDP, is about 0.70 (see Gollin (2002) ) and so the value of α was set to 0.70.
The preference parameter θ is the exponent to consumption of the local good in the utility function. Utility maximization by people implies that the expenditure share of the local good in household budgets should be θ. The expenditure shares of urban wage earners and clerical workers reported in Jacobs and Shipp (1990) suggest that people spend half their income on local goods and so θ was set to 0.50 12 The value of ν is obtained from micro-studies that estimate the degree of agglomeration economies for U.S. cities. As discussed in Moomaw (1981) , the most common way of obtaining such an estimate is to use the zero-profit condition for firms to deliver a relationship between a location's nominal wage and such characteristics as its population size, industry mix, etc. In this approach, an estimate of the coefficient on population size is an estimate of the strength of agglomeration 11 All MSA and CMSA definitions pertain to 1990. 12 The expenditure shares on food, shelter, utilities (including fuels and public services), public transportation, entertainment, and sundries summed amount to 56.8 percent of total household expenditures (Table 2, p. 22). Since some of these components are not entirely local a somewhat lower value of θ is appropriate.
economies. In the model, the zero-profit condition (11) , in conjunction with agglomeration function (2), implies:
where n i is the natural log of N i , n is the natural log of N , and χ i is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 when n i exceeds n and 0 otherwise. Empirical specifications surveyed in Moomaw do not take into account the possibility of an agglomeration threshold and so, in effect, assume that χ i = 1 for all locations. But these studies examine metropolitan areas only and so this omission will not create any problems provided n is relatively small. Sveikauskas (1975) and n i , omission of relevant location-specific factors will bias the estimates of ν · α −1 upward. The baseline calibration will take ν to be 0.02 but will examine the sensitivity of the results to lower and higher values. 13 There are no direct estimates of the agglomeration threshold parameter N . However, as noted above, empirical researchers interested in measuring the strength of agglomeration economies have looked only at metropolitan areas. Therefore, the implicit assumption in the empirical literature seems to be that agglomeration economies are not relevant for rural areas. Given this, baseline calibration of the model will take N to be 35, 000. This value is only slightly smaller than the smallest employment level among metropolitan localities in 1999. Thus, with this value, rural counties do not experience any benefits of agglomeration but all urban localities do. The sensitivity of the results to higher and lower values of N will be discussed. The land area of each locality is obtained from direct observation. 15 The parameter choices and ranges discussed so far are summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 Calibration Guidelines of Some Model Parameters Table   14 Roback (1982) estimated a relationship between the logarithm of the site price of residential land and population density, controlling for several city-specific factors. The coefficient on the density variable in her regression is 2.0×10 −4 (Table 3 , p. 1272). Since the median employment to population ratio for metropolitan areas in my data set is 0.57, Roback's estimate of the density coefficient implies a γ value of 3.6 × 10 −4 . This is estimate is of the same order of magnitude as the one used in the calibration. 15 For CMSAs and MSAs the land area refers to the area of a commuting unit. Since commuting presupposes the existence of transportation infrastructure, taking the land area as given is tantamount to taking the transportation infrastructure as given. The counterfactuals performed in this paper thus assume no change in the transportation infrastructure. 
For localities in Group I, it follows from (25) that
That is, all localities in this group are in a corner equilibrium without any mobile workers. Furthermore, (26) implies an upper bound on the strength of locality-specific factors, namely
For localities in Group II, (21) implies
and (23), implies
In addition, (22) implies that
This last restriction asserts that if there is at least one mobile individual in locality i, s i must attain its upper bound and, conversely, if s i does not attain its upper bound, there must not be any mobile individuals in locality i. In what follows it is assumed that every locality in Group II has d i equal to −a i , i.e., in each of these localities there is a single immobile resident. Since every location in our data set has more than 1 resident, this assumption means that s i of a Group II locality is given by
The final set of parameters to be pinned down are the s for Group I localities. As noted earlier, the model and the data do not restrict the level of s for these localities other than to say that each must be strictly less than the upper bounds implied by the stability of low-density equilibria. To make the s "observable," it is assumed that the distribution of s for localities in Group I is no different from the distribution of s for localities in Group II. Under this assumption, the observed distribution of s for localities in the Group II is used to assign to each i in Group I the average value of s conditional on s i not exceeding its upper bound given by (28). 16 
Computational Experiments
To quantitatively assess the role of agglomeration economies in spatial concentration, we need a way to describe and summarize the degree of spatial concentration in employment. An attractive way to do this is by using Lorenz curves. In the present context, a Lorenz curve is constructed by first ordering the localities by their employment density, with the most dense locality being ranked first. Then, the cumulative percentage of land areas (running from 0 to 100) of localities so ordered is plotted against the cumulative percentage of employment. If employment were uniformly distributed over the U.S. continental landmass, this plot would coincide with the 45-degree line.
But if employment is not uniformly distributed, the curve will be bowed above the 45-degree line.
As Figure 4 shows, the curve is indeed heavily bowed. The top 1 percent of the densest U.S.
territory accounts for about 15 percent of total employment, the top 2 percent accounts for about 25 percent, and the top 15 percent accounts for 50 percent. The Gini coefficient associated with this Lorenz curve is 0.78. This summary measure of spatial concentration is used in this study. 17 In the baseline calibration, parameters for which a range is specified in Table 1 (ν, N and δ)
are set to the values noted in boldface. All other parameters are set as noted in Table 1 . Thus, the baseline calibration implies µ/δ is 57 workers per square mile (rounded). Since N = 35, 000, any locality with employment greater than 35, 000 and employment density less than or equal to 57 is in Group I, i.e., in the group of localities that are in a corner equilibrium with
In the baseline calibration Group I contains 104 localities and 5.17 percent of employment. The remaining 2, 419 localities fall into Group II. For these Group II localities the value of s i is given by equation (32). As described at the end of the previous section, the distribution of s for Group II localities is used to estimate the s i 's for Group I localities.
For the counterfactual, a new equilibrium is calculated with the agglomeration parameter ν set to zero (all other parameters unchanged) and allowing for free mobility of all workers. In the absence of agglomeration economies, the v i (d) function is downward sloping for every locality and, consequently, there is no possibility of multiple equilibria. In the new unique equilibrium, differences in employment density across localities stem entirely from differences in the s i . So, whatever inequality remains after elimination of agglomeration economies is the result of inequality in fundamentals. Figure 6 plots the frequency distribution of the imputed location-specific factors. The mean of the distribution is about 4 and most of the mass is concentrated around the mean. However, there are a few localities with very high and very low location-specific factors.
It is useful then to understand where these differences in fundamentals come from. Consider follows that the locality with the larger-sized commuting area will be imputed a lower s i than the locality with a smaller-sized commuting area. Hence, two metro areas with the same observed employment density can be imputed rather different fundamentals. By continuity, a metro area with a higher employment density but smaller commuting area may be imputed a lower value of s i than a metro area with a lower employment density but a larger commuting area. Nevertheless, the rank correlation between employment density and imputed fundamentals is positive for metro areas -being 0.70 for the baseline calibration.
The fact that observed imputed fundamentals are positively related to observed employment density suggests an important distinction between the effects of agglomeration economies on employment concentration and its effects on economic geography. That high-density localities tend to have high TFP/amenity index means the ranking of localities in the new equilibrium need not be very different from the current ranking of localities with respect to employment density. Indeed, the rank correlation between actual density and the density in the counterfactual is 0.85. Thus the counterfactual does not imply vastly different economic geography -localities that are currently dense are also the localities that tend to be relatively dense in the counterfactual.
Another important and distinct effect of agglomeration economies concerns its effect on welfare.
In principle, eliminating agglomeration economies need not affect welfare. The easiest way to see this is to consider mobile workers in rural areas. These workers are not directly affected by the suppression of agglomeration economies. But they are indirectly affected because suppression of agglomeration economies releases urban workers who seek employment in rural areas. If these dis-placed urban workers could be accommodated without increasing the price of the locally produced good, then there would be no change in economic welfare (but there will still be large changes in employment concentration). However, land available for production in rural areas is fixed and increasing employment density in these areas raises congestion costs. Consequently, utility obtained by mobile workers decline. We can calculate the welfare loss of a mobile worker by calculating the wage tax a mobile worker would be willing to pay to not live in world where agglomeration economies are absent. 18 For the baseline calibration, this equivalent wage tax is 6.81 percent.
It is remarkable that the rather small increasing returns parameter of 0.02 (which implies that the productivity of a locality increases by 2 percent as the locality doubles in size) implies such a large welfare loss from its elimination. The reason the change is so large is because the elimination of agglomeration economies means that 93.5 percent of workers cannot be profitably employed in their existing location: firms cannot pay their workers enough to compensate them for congestion costs associated with living in dense localities. These urban workers would prefer to move to less dense rural localities -the localities that are initially unaffected by the suppression of agglomeration economies. Consequently, congestion costs rise rapidly in the rural areas and causes the new equilibrium utility to be significantly lower.
So far it has been assumed that individuals are free to relocate when agglomeration economies are suppressed. However, in the calibration of the model it was necessary to assume that some localities had only immobile workers. If we interpret this immobility as an overarching desire to live and work in a particular location, then the immobility reflects an aspect of preferences that we might wish to respect in the counterfactual. This can be done by requiring that for any location in a corner equilibrium must have at least as many workers in the new, counterfactual, equilibrium. For the baseline calibration, the results are not very different when this requirement is imposed. The counterfactual Gini coefficient is somewhat lower than the Gini coefficient reported earlier, being 0.36. The percentage decline in the Gini index is 51 percent. The rank correlation between the actual and counterfactual employment densities is 0.87. The welfare loss (in terms of the equivalent wage tax) remains the same. That difference in the result is small is not surprising because only slightly more than 5 percent of workers are immobile. How sensitive are these results to the choice of parameter values? Table 2 presents results for different choices of ν and Table 3 Finally, Table 4 shows the sensitivity of the results to a change in the value of the agglomeration threshold. In this case the results are rather sensitive to the choice of threshold parameter. If the threshold parameter is set at half its baseline value, there is a small change in the contribution of agglomeration economies to spatial concentration, but there is a large effect on economic geography -the rank correlation between actual and counterfactual density drops to 0.56. In contrast, if the agglomeration threshold is set to twice its baseline value, the contribution of agglomeration economies to spatial concentration drops to 41.6 percent while the rank correlation rises to 0.97.
There is not much change in the welfare loss figures. 
